Commentary/Amberish K Diwanji

Indo-US ties: The need for Pragmatism

Prime Minister Inder Kumar Gujral's visit to the United States and his meeting with United States President Bill Clinton has brought some good cheer during days when there aren't many things to cheer about. There does appear to be a warming up in the US's attitude towards India, and certainly the media hype surrounding India's fifty years of Independence might have something to do with it. The media has hailed India's single greatest achievement -- retaining democracy -- something Uncle Sam promotes all over the globe.

Yet, one must not expect too much. In India, the mistake made too often is to get emotional in our relationships -- someone is either a friend or an enemy, good or bad. Seeing situations and ties in black and white where mostly shades of grey exist is often what blinkers our vision. Former foreign secretary J N Dixit clearly pointed out that the US bases its relations on its national interests, nothing more or less. Sino-US ties have only prospered over the years because it is in the national interests of both, not because the two countries have fallen in love across the Pacific. And if today the US expresses concern at Beijing's growing might, it is only because the US is naturally concerned of another superpower rival which might harm its long-term national interest. India must follow suit.

If there is one area for feeling triumphant, it is in the area of no longer perceiving US as the Enemy No 2 (No 1 still remains our neighbour to the West!). Gujral himself commented on this aspect before departing for New York. Die-hard leftists (who unfortunately still exercise authority while holding no responsibility for India's state of affairs) still perceive the US as a foe out to harm the poor and the weak, and liberalisation as a US plot to destroy India. On the other hand, the right-wing see the US as trying to cap our nuclear programme, take away Kashmir, and break up the country to set up weak protectorates. Thus, bad Indo-US ties had much to do with the old mindset.

Ever since the Bay of Bengal fiasco in 1971 (when the Seventh Fleet moved into the Bay during the Bangladesh Liberation War), India has remained suspicious of US motives. India's tilt towards the then Soviet Union would grow and peak when in 1980, Indira Gandhi's government would support Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan. So-called socialists and left-wing intellectuals walking the corridors of power and lecturing at every seminar, would hold forth on the 'Evil USA', hail Che Guevera and Marxist Cuba, and organise demonstrations with like-minded persons outside various US consulates and information centres. The socialists may have their own preferences, and in international affairs, that should be secondary. The left-wingers never saw the long-term risks to India caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (one has been the increased religious fanaticism in the region).

It boggles the mind that even a realist like Indira Gandhi saw no danger in this expansion, or perhaps she was misled by her pro-Soviet advisors. Even if Moscow was a friend, its presence in the neighbourhood can only spell long-term danger in a world where there are no permanent friends or foes, only permanent interests. Not all Indians welcomed the Soviet invasion. It seems that Charan Singh, who was the caretaker prime minister in December 1979 when the invasion occurred, had no intention of supporting Moscow. When the USSR ambassador told Singh that the Soviet army was invited by the then Afghan president, Singh retorted: "Did he invite you so that you could kill him?" But he was not at the helm in January 1980 and India missed a great chance to show its non-alignment then by continually backing Moscow in pubic fora.

The second problem was economic. It was of little consequence for the US. Indians have often fretted that the US never acknowledged or respected India, the world's largest democracy, a country where English is spoken, and despite the great achievements of Indian expatriates in the Land of Opportunity. But the reason probably is that in economic terms, India then had little to offer. Nationalisation saw most multinationals pull out or reduce their stake (and involvement) in Indian companies, culminating in the famous walkout by Coca-Cola in 1977, courtesy the Janata Party. More that just losing a soft drink and one of America's greatest symbols, India's image suffered.

The US is India's largest trading partner, and was so in the past decade. But India is not even in the Top 10 among the US trading partners. If only on this count, it is imperative for India to seek to expand its ties with the US.

Our old economic policies helped India miss the beginning of financial globalisation. Today, Indians are hailed for their software expertise, yet the personal computer revolution could not take place in India for long because our isolation saw little computer presence in the country. Worse, our socialist ideologues, would miss the Himalayan changes taking place across the mountains in China. Abandoning socialism at the same time that India was busy throwing out Coca-Cola and IBM, Deng Xiaoping began liberalising certain selected zones in the southern region. This change would dramatically increase China's economic wealth and widen the lead China had over India.

One can see from the above how non-pragmatism hurt Indo-US ties. It is time to move out of that syndrome, and on to a clean slate. This does not mean that ideologies have died; they have just assumed different guises. For instance, human rights, especially in Kashmir and Punjab; self-determination in Kashmir; nuclear disarmament and CTBT; etc, these issues will crop up during discussions. So rather than get carried away by Gujral's recent success, we should be hopefully cautious. Certainly economics is the key, only proving that the business of America is business! Excellent economic ties with China explains why year after year, lobbyists for human rights, Tibet, and Taiwan make little headway in Capitol Hill or the White House. It will also explain why an anti-India bill this year was defeated by margins better than ever before.

Many had feared that at that at the Gujral-Clinton summit meeting, the US would armtwist India into a deal on Kashmir, but that has not happened. On the contrary, Washington has said that Kashmir should be resolved bilaterally, which is what New Delhi has been harping on. South Block has reason to smile! But was everythig so hunkydory? It seems that India has agreed to discuss the Comprehensive (nuclear) Test Ban Treaty, perhaps as a tradeoff on Kashmir. For political reasons, India is unlikely to sign the CTBT in its present form, but even then, India does seem to be abiding by the treaty, making it a de facto member if not de jure. This for the time being might be enough for the US.

There has also been talk of the US making India a strategic partner, but which term is unexplained. India has no reason to enter into any pact with the US aimed against anybody. Analysts suggest that it might be a ploy to contain China, which they harp will be India's long-term rival. This again is debateable. China and India will be competitors, that is certain. That they will be rivals is not. It might suit the Western media to paint China as a dangerous giant, but let us judge actions and stay prepared. China could benefit from both the US and USSR in the Cold War era, and India can do the same. New Delhi-Beijing ties are improving, and there is every reason to go along that line. One must not steer clear of both the Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai syndrome or the 1962 psychosis.

Indians are by nature considered emotional rather than cool rationalists. If that is our nature, that is fine, but in dealing with matters of state, the latter remains important. What benefits India matters, and it pays to remember that. Gujral, who has failed on many fronts within India, has shown great acumen in dealing with the US, and one hopes he is still at the helm when Clinton visits India in February 1998. And hopefully, Gujral will not rush in to embrace Clinton like he did Saddam Hussein after the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait, sending shock ripples across the globe. Let's just talk business.

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