On the eve of an expected Senate debate and vote on the enabling legislation to facilitate the US-India civilian nuclear agreement and the visit of Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf to Washington for talks with President Bush, a leading think tank has said it is ironic that in US governmental circles there is so much optimism over the former and cynicism over the latter.
In a backgrounder titled, 'Geo-Strategic Partners or Partners of Convenience?' the Henry Stimson Center -- the only Washington think tank with an exclusive confidence building measures programme on South Asia, said, "Boosters of the US-India nuclear deal view this as a harbinger of a new geo-strategic partnership that will yield significant, albeit vague benefits."
"Supporters of the US-Pakistan partnership," it said, "believe that Islamabad's help is essential to counter Islamic extremism within the country and along its periphery."
But the Stimson Center backgrounder, written by its founder and president emeritus Michael Krepon, noted, "One of the oddities of this week's juxtaposition of events is how much optimism Washington places on the Indian geo-strategic partnership, and how much cynicism is attached to the partnership with Pakistan."
He argued that "excessive optimism or pessimism is unwise and unhelpful," and noted that "both partnerships can produce mutual dividends when national interests and domestic politics are in alignment. But at present, significant divergences remain in both cases."
Krepon said, "The extent of these divergences was in display in Havana last week," during the Non-Aligned Summit meeting, where Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh "had a photo opportunity and a meeting with Fidel Castro, while foregoing a trip to the United States and a meeting with President Bush."
"This speaks volumes about his government's political sensitivities in the wake of signing the nuclear cooperation agreement," he said. "The Indian prime minister's primary need at this hour is to distance New Delhi from the Bush administration's agenda. Hence, India's endorsement of the NAM summit final communiqué."
"Musharraf, the Bush administration's other strategic partner in South Asia, also endorsed the NAM agenda," Krepon acknowledged.
"Are these endorsements mere political verbiage?" Krepon asked, and said, "If so, should pledges directed to US audiences also be discounted? Or do these statements reflect serious differences in national interests? Will domestic political realities in India and Pakistan continue to constrain the extent of their partnerships with the United States?"
Krepon predicted that "clear answers to these questions will unfold in due course. There are already many reasons to be concerned about the state of US-Pakistan relations. The language of the NAM communiqué also suggests the need to contain irrational exuberance about prospects for a close US-India strategic partnership."