Indo-US nuclear treaty: A good deal

Setting polemics aside, the statement deserves to be welcomed for a number of reasons.

First, it opens many doors for generation of a significantly higher percentage of electricity generation with nuclear power reactors than the present very low percentage of about 2.5%.

Second, the prospect of reducing our energy production deficit through building and commissioning more power reactors (based on low enrichment uranium and unit size of 1,000 Mwe or more) in a short period (now about 4 years compared to seven or eight years earlier) brightens up very considerably.

Third, the spiraling price of oil would upset the kwh cost of distributed electricity from non-nuclear plants and customers, both industrial and non-industrial, may not be assumed to be forever docile.

Fourth, there is a finite probability of disruptions in assured fuel supply over the lifetime of coal or oil plants due to factors beyond the producer's control. Generally, such disruptions in nuclear facilities are overplayed while those in non-nuclear plants are underplayed.

Fifth, the pace of building nuclear power plants with foreign assistance has been poor due to a twisted interpretation of 'self reliance' and the price being paid for 'indigenisation'. This price increases by the day.

An important fact or factor seems to be missed by critics who perceive this development in Indo-US relations as a Faustian bargain. Nuclear majors in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) like Germany, Canada, France and Russia have not been able to make their presence felt much in India mainly due to the position held by the US that nuclear cooperation with non-NPT countries should be actively discouraged.

The Manmohan–Bush statement effectively makes this opposition a thing of the past. And, as such, be warmly welcomed by them. It goes a step further. Enriched uranium supplies would be smooth and uninterrupted. (India's own uranium enrichment efforts have not yet reached the industrial production levels yet. As and when these levels are attained, it can be assumed safely that the annual mass of imported enriched uranium would decrease).

The nuclear power reactor design and manufacture industry in the US has been lying dormant for nearly three decades. So, the prospect of a US firm building power reactors for India is zero or negligible -- assuming that India would approach US industry. Hence, concerns raised in this regard do not appear to be based on facts on the US ground. However, the withdrawal of US opposition to India's nuclear power reactor programme sends a clear signal to France, Canada, Germany and Russia. They can breathe easy and do not need to be apprehensive of US reactions.

In the long term, if the US nuclear industry is nursed back to its feet by US domestic polices, there would be viable competition to Europe and Russia which would, almost certainly, be to the customer's advantage.

There is sound technical analysis to support the position that the plutonium generated in power reactors is quite unsuitable for building up a nuclear arsenal. It is very doubtful that strategic planners and the armed forces would accept an arsenal with weapons of unpredictable (call it statistical, if you wish) yield. And, it is also very doubtful whether `tactical' nuclear weapons with yields in the few kilotons range using reactor-grade plutonium need to find a place at all in the Indian arsenal. The Minimum Credible Deterrence doctrine declared by India in May 1998 does not need tactical weapons.

The Koodangulam power reactors built in Tamil Nadu by Russia will reduce the energy deficit in the Southern Grid when it goes critical and gets synched with the grid in the coming years. The contract says that spent fuel (containing plutonium, of course) would be returned to Russia, thank you. We need electricity not this spent fuel. It is worth reminding ourselves of Dr Homi Bhabha's words: No energy is more costly than no energy.