Professor Saeed Shafqat, Distinguished Professor (Pakistan Studies) at the School of International and Public Affairs, Southern Asian Insitute, Columbia Institute, and founding member of the Department of Pakistan Studies at Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad, spoke to Tanmay Kumar Nanda in New York recently about Kashmir, the ISI's role and the prospects for peace in South Asia.

Part I: 'Once political parties come into power, politics is restored, then the war game may change'

You said the jehadi groups have taken over the anti-India issue. How much will the anti-India issue be important in the polls?

That is a really sad and unfortunate development. There is a serious need that something must be thought about since there is total breakdown between India and Pakistan. The two countries are virtually incommunicado. That is the worst thing that could happen to the two countries. This has resulted in deep distrust because there is no communication and whenever any incident happens in either country, the tendency is to blame the other.

If this endless blame game continues, the region is going to end up in a vicious circle, in fact it is already in that circle. It has led to a situation where South Asia continues to suffer from Cold War and continues to lag behind the rest of the world. There is a tremendous challenge for intellectuals, policy makes, opinion builders on both sides of the fence to really take this as a challenge and think of alternatives of exploring the possibility of really reducing tensions.

To what extent are both the ruling powers responsible? You have a hardline right wing party on one side and a military dictator who overthrew a democratically elected government on the other, and both seem to doing a lot of sabre-rattling.

Sabre rattling is the right word, which has become a way of life in South Asia. The hope and expectation was -- in Pakistan, once the BJP came to power and in India, when the military came to power -- that may be the hardliners would create a space for possible mutual accommodation and understanding. Nevertheless, that has not really happened. And that's why I say there is now a greater challenge for civil society in both countries to look into the possibility of understanding and appreciating how much state antagonism is impacting the lives of ordinary people.

And if we really want to reverse -- and there is a possibility -- we have to think about the security of the citizens, both of who are undergoing enormous difficulties. South Asia appears to have become ungovernable because the extremist religious forces have been unleashed to a point where the state has become hostage to extremists. There is a challenge for the leadership to rethink as well as the intellectual and policy makers to see how to get out of this vicious circle.

What does this do for South Asia as a global entity, as a region? Especially from the Western perspective, such as America, where it was seen as the hottest place in the world recently.

Over three years, it has reached a point where India and Pakistan being nuclear capable, mutually hostile and unable to resolve disputes are seen as countries where religious fanaticism added to conflict and nukes has become a primary source of concern. It has led to criticism of the ability of the leaders to govern and also has given rise to the fear that perhaps Indian and Pakistan are not responsible enough. And that anything can go wrong because they have not been able to contain religious militants and when you have, if one may say, incompetent leadership which is unable to deal with the people and satisfy its own needs.

So the real need for South Asia is to minimise conflict, to contain religious militancy and to portray to the world that if they can acquire nuclear capability, they are responsible enough and they have greater potential, greater manpower. And that if India and Pakistan were to disengage from conflict, they can provide peace dividends to their people in the form of education, health, housing and other development.

Coming back to the polls, President Musharraf has been an ally of the US in the war on terror. How will political parties react to his alliance with the Western world and what will be the effect on the war on terror?

Well, so far the political parties in general have not been openly critical of reliance or alliance with the US. They have been very careful in criticising Musharraf for abandoning the Taliban government. They have been critical also of his approach after the December incident towards Kashmir. In the eyes of many, it was almost like a revision of the Kashmir policy where he categorically, at least in public, stated that Pakistan would not tolerate any terrorism, either within or without and totally disassociated himself from that.

This was not well received, especially by the religious political parties. For them, the Kashmir issue was a religious cause and part of the unfinished Partition agenda and in the last 10 years or so, especially after Kargil, they hijacked Kashmir as an issue and became champions of the Kashmiri cause. The political parties didn't respond adequately and so the religious groups became champions of the issue. Which is also why you saw, on both sides, religion emerging as a key issue as far as hostility was concerned.

So the real nature of the dispute between India and Pakistan and Kashmir and Kashmiris was set aside and the religious issue acquired fanatic, unresolvable overtones. And my sense of it is that both countries in a way fell into this trap of extremist groups because both constantly tried to get the other declared as a terrorist state.

To what extent will Kashmir be an issue in the Pakistan polls?

Kashmir does not seem to be an important electoral issue. There appears to be a broad consensus among all political parties that Kashmir is a disputed area and Pakistan needs to support it morally and politically. Invariably, most political parties have stated that position and not gone beyond that.

In that case, what are the likely issues that will affect voting?

In the current elections, the issues are really domestic. Basically, the revival of economy, job opportunities, development in the areas that these contestants are and more important, the real concern and question is how to decide on sharing power. What is critical for the political parties is what will they do with the NSC, and how will they deal with the 52-8-b that allows the president to dismiss assemblies and undermined the sovereignty of parliament.

Do you see a clash between Musharraf and the political parties, since the issue is bound to come up?

I don't see a head-on clash between the parties and Musharraf, not right now. One was hoping that the political parties would have learnt from the past and that the PML and PPP would band together and make seat adjustments. But each party will continue to hold and fall back on its vote bank. So they have made just minor adjustments here and there.

On a grand strategy or coalition, that does not seem to be the case, political parties are divided. In all probability, it will be more or less a hung parliament without anyone likely to get a decisive majority. The real political force will be among three groupings: PPP, PML (N) and PML (Q) -- which the military supports -- on the political plane, and the religious groups.

What will be the fate of the NSC in the post-electoral period?

Apparently, its history can be traced from 1970-1971, during the final phase of General Yahya Khan, but it subsided after the 1973 constitution, when basic principles established consensus on a federal parliamentary system, including autonomy, religion and federal government.

The NSC idea really emerged in 1996-1997 during the interim government of Malik Mehra Khalid after Bhutto's government was overthrown and dismissed by President Farooq Leghari. By enlarging the NSC, the balance of power remains tilted towards the president, who wouldn't become a titular head like the Indian President, as had been envisaged in the 1973 constitution. And the sitting army chiefs are in it, so the intention is that instead of the military accepting supremacy of civilian government, it is a mechanism through which military-civilian sharing of power is projected.

Do you see that happening?

The military has shown that it would like to share power, elected or unelected is a non-issue. Although President Musharraf calls it 'checks and balances', the checks as well as the balances are unelected. The parliamentarians will say we are representing the people. The issue will be 'who will decide,' who will have greatest executive decision. The recent changes give the president the powers. (Nawaz) Sharif had these powers taken away and while political leaders would like to have those powers, the military will see it as uncouth, uncivilised, uneducated parliamentarians making appointments on political basis rather than merit and will unnecessarily interfere.

How will the US support for Musharraf continue if democratic institutions will be in second place?

The interesting feature from the referendum is that he's there for five years so there will be continuity. Also, with the introduction of 58-2-b, he will have discretionary power to dismiss government. If an elected government is not in conformity or not supportive of continuing policy, it won't last long. Apparently, it seems that when Musharraf was here, he was accompanied by constitutional experts and it is indicated that the issue was discussed and the US doesn't have major criticism.

So is the US silence one of convenience?

Perhaps. Silence which is meaningful because they would like to see a continuity of policies.

What about the people's wishes?

There is a lot of apathy, lot of disappointment with political parties, people are more concerned with their economic well being, law and order, education, basic needs, these are the real needs. But despite apathy, once the political process has been restored, we are seeing that there is a larger number of people turning out and participating in public meetings. How big they are remains to be seen, but it is not the same as earlier.

Won't the US support for Musharraf also mean more economic aid for Pakistan?

Had there been discontent, then people would have come out on the streets. On one side, there is apathy and lack of interest in the political process, but there is some degree of satisfaction among people that the current government has restored some degree of order. And violence, particularly sectarian, has gone down. The current violence is more an outcome of the Afghan situation where you are seeing attacks on Christians or churches or foreigners, which was never the case in Pakistan, so that is the tension.

On the other side, remittances and money has gone to Pakistan, since people outside are keeping too much money after 9/11. There's a huge rise in foreign exchange reserves. The difference is that an investor-friendly environment is yet to emerge. Neither the private investor in Pakistan nor the foreigner has had confidence or has been encouraged.

The remnants of Al Qaeda are said to be in Pakistan. Has the crackdown slowed down after over an year?

It hasn't slowed, there is actually an upswing in trying to capture remnants of Al Qaeda and Taliban. The Musharraf government has greater confidence with the support of US and FBI collaborating with Pakistan law enforcement. Also, the Al Qaeda types are desperadoes, who can't go back to their own countries. So their terrorism is basically survival. It is not clear if they have been able to revive jehadi cells because the government is very clear and then there is the FBI. IT has become much more difficult for jehadi groups.

What happens to the role of the ISI in the new scenario?

The entire role of ISI has been redefined immediately after 9/11. I don't agree that ISI ever acted independently or autonomously. Like any other agency in the world, it followed policies given to it by respective governments. During the Afghan war, the ISI acquired a role larger than its size. It also believed it had waged a successful war and it was responsible for the dismemberment of the USSR -- which they had in some way -- and once President Zia (-ul Haq) restored the political process, he gave the ISI a political role where it was not simply managing war but also domestic politics.

Post 9/11, there has been an important revision on that. Once again, Pakistan's law enforcement will benefit from US training. It's a different kind of turnaround, it will take time but there will be some movement in that direction.

One major change is the restoration of the joint consultative group between Pakistan and US, which was suspended since 1997-98 and has been revived.

Design: Dominic Xavier

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