NEWSLINKS
US EDITION
COLUMNISTS
DIARY
SPECIALS
INTERVIEWS
CAPITAL BUZZ
REDIFF POLL
THE STATES
ELECTIONS
ARCHIVES
SEARCH REDIFF

Search the Internet          Tips

Recent Columns

The dangers of      intelligence      co-operation Musharraf or worse? Musharraf's speech      was an anti-climax Kaluchak and after Who bombed the      French?

India-Pakistan: Need for Para-diplomacy

India has three main expectations from Pakistan before it could agree to a military deescalation along the international border and the Line of Control in Jammu & Kashmir and the resumption of the bilateral dialogue on all contentious issues, including the future of J&K -- first, a permanent stoppage of cross-border infiltration; second, a permanent end to the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan directed against India; and third, the permanent abandonment by Pakistan of its use of state-sponsored terrorism as a weapon against India to achieve the annexation of J&K.

As against this, Pakistan has two expectations from India: first, military de-escalation; and second, the resumption of the bilateral dialogue on the future of J&K and other issues, with the main focus on J&K.

Through American interlocutors, General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator, has given an assurance that he has already ordered an end to cross-border/LoC infiltrations. India's contention is that the infiltration has only decreased, but not ended and that the decrease appears to be more tactical, in response to US pressure, than strategic due to any change of its policy. Pakistan is not prepared, at this stage, to respond positively to India's other two demands unless and until India appropriately reciprocates its claimed action on the infiltration issue.

The American interlocutors have been reiterating to India their assurance that they would keep up the pressure on Musharraf to end the terrorist infrastructure too, but it is uncertain as to what extent Musharraf would be responsive to their pressure on this issue.

A fourth Indian expectation, which has now assumed importance in the context of the forthcoming election to the J&K legislative assembly, is that Islamabad would ensure that the terrorist elements under its control would not try to disrupt the election through acts of terrorism. While this expectation has received the unanimous endorsement of the international community, it is doubtful as to what extent they, particularly the US, would be able to ensure fulfillment of this legitimate expectation of India by Islamabad.

The matter has got stuck there with no visible breakthrough despite the recent visits of Jack Straw, the British foreign secretary, and Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, to the two capitals.

Though there has been no disruption of the diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan, the bilateral channels of communications have got so clogged up by considerations of prestige, the need for face-saving etc that they are not in a position, through direct interactions at the political or diplomatic levels, to probe each other's mind on these issues without arousing public expectations and adding to the already poisoned atmosphere due to the Pakistani-sponsorship of terrorism.

They have thus been obliged to depend upon third powers, mainly the US, to act as intermediaries to probe and influence the mind of each for the benefit of the other. This exercise too has not led to a thaw. On the contrary, as seen from Powell's recent visit to India and Pakistan, misunderstandings over phrases, formulations etc openly expressed threaten to have a negative impact even on the relations of India with the US, which have taken a turn for the better since the Kargil conflict of 1999.

How to get out of this log jam? How to probe each other's mind on these issues away from the glare of publicity and without arousing undue public expectations? How to try to understand each other's willingness to move forward and the constraints on such forward movement? How to compromise without losing face and how to stand firm without further poisoning the bilateral atmosphere? How to discuss freely, frankly and politely each other's suspicions and complaints against the other without indulging in public breast-beating? How to set in motion imperceptibly, without formal commitments, a thaw through informal, almost paperless powwow, thus paving the way for the formal diplomatic process leading to formal commitments later on?

It is here that the role of para-diplomacy comes in.

Para-diplomacy is informal diplomacy without the formal involvement of the official diplomatic channels to sort out sensitive bilateral issues and to remove misunderstandings. There are three ground rules to para-diplomacy -- first, there shall be no publicity and no attempt to create embarrassment for each other; second, the probings/interactions would be informal and nothing said or done during the para-diplomacy would be taken as amounting to formal commitments; and, third, no notes or minutes kept unilaterally by each side would be used against the other if the para-diplomacy fails.

Para-diplomacy is of two kinds -- first, through non-official intermediaries enjoying the confidence of the two leaderships; and second, through the heads of the external intelligence agencies of the two countries.

An example of the first kind was the para-diplomatic dialogue between Prime Minister A B Vajpayee and his Pakistani counterpart, Nawaz Sharif, during the Kargil conflict through the intermediary of an Indian journalist and a retired Pakistani diplomat. These were two para-diplomatic channels which were reportedly operating in parallel, without the one possibly being aware of the other.

This could not produce positive results due to Sharif's inability to control Musharraf, the then chief of the army staff.

The second kind is through the heads of the external intelligence agencies. Para-diplomacy through the agency heads works better due to the following reasons: first, there is greater secrecy and discretion; second, the agency heads enjoy direct access to the head of the government and his/her total confidence and hence can interpret their views better than a non-official intermediary; third, they are better informed than non-official intermediaries because of their access to all information at the disposal of the government, open or secret; and fourth, however strained the bilateral relations, the agencies of adversary nations manage to maintain a minimum civility in their bilateral interactions.

Even during the worst days of Indo-US relations, the Central Intelligence Agency and India's Research & Analysis Wing managed to maintain civility, openness and flexibility in their bilateral contacts with the approval of the political leaderships of the two countries. So was the case with regard to China. Even though India's relations with the erstwhile USSR and Russia had always been close and cordial, there were occasions, particularly in 1991-92, when signs of concern and misgivings emerged. The political leaderships of the two countries immediately had them removed through para-diplomatic interactions between Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service and RAW.

When Indo-US relations threatened to go into a bad patch during the first years of the Reagan Administration due to misunderstandings in Washington DC over India's Afghanistan policy and in India over the access enjoyed by the Khalistani elements to political and agency circles in the US, Ronald Reagan and Indira Gandhi managed to have these misunderstandings removed through para-diplomatic contacts between R N Kao, the founding father of RAW, who was her senior adviser after his retirement from RAW, and George Bush, the father of the present president and then vice-president under Reagan. In the 1970s, Kao and Bush had developed a personal friendship and mutual regard for each other when they headed the external agencies of the two countries. Mrs Gandhi and Reagan used this to restore cordiality in the bilateral relations and remove the points of friction.

Similarly, in 1984, Mrs Gandhi sent Kao on a para-diplomatic visit to Beijing, organised by the Yugoslav intelligence agency, to test the waters for a possible visit by her to restore normalcy and cordiality to the bilateral relations despite the pending border dispute. Unfortunately, when Kao was in Beijing holding talks with Chinese officials and leaders, Mrs Gandhi was assassinated and the exercise was disrupted.

Rajiv Gandhi resumed this para-diplomatic exercise through A K Verma, who became the head of RAW in 1987. The preparatory work for Rajiv Gandhi's highly successful visit to Beijing in 1988 and his meeting with Deng Xiaoping was largely done through the para-diplomatic channels of the external agencies of the two countries. On his return from Beijing, Rajiv Gandhi had the highest praise for RAW's contribution in this matter.

The RAW archives would have many other instances of such beneficial use of para-diplomatic channels of RAW by Indira and Rajiv Gandhi to deal with, away from the glare of publicity, sensitive aspects of India's relations with many countries such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Afghanistan, the UK etc.

In 1988, an eminent West Asian leader, who was a good personal friend of Zia-ul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi, and who was greatly concerned over the deterioration in Indo-Pakistan relations after India's military exercise code-named Operation Brass Tacks and due to Indian allegations of Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism in Punjab, suggested that instead of public breast-beating the two leaders discuss each other's concerns and allegations through the para-diplomatic channel of RAW and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence. He offered to arrange the first meeting between the heads of the two agencies in his capital.

Before the exercise could take off, Zia died in the plane crash, but Benazir Bhutto, who succeeded him, and her successor, Nawaz Sharif, approved the exercise at the request of the West Asian leader. Three para-diplomatic meetings were held between the heads of the two agencies -- two during the tenure of Benazir and the third during Sharif's tenure. During these meetings, India's allegations of Pakistani involvement in Punjab and the differences over Siachen were discussed in some detail. However, there was no significant outcome.

The principal reason for this was that whereas in the case of other countries such as the US, China etc, a satisfactory liaison relationship between the agencies was already functioning for the exchange of intelligence before the heads of the agencies were entrusted with a para-diplomatic role by the political leaderships, in the case of Pakistan, there was practically no contact between the two agencies and their senior officials till 1988 except during the visits of the leaders of the two countries to each other's capital. Their knowledge of each other was limited to what they had been reading about each other in the media and secret source reports. In the absence of mutual trust and professional esteem arising from direct contacts over a period of time, the ice remained largely unbroken.

When the relations between India and Pakistan again went into a bad patch after the Mumbai blasts of March 12, 1993, the US and China, independently of each other and with each not knowing of the initiative of the other, offered to arrange a para-diplomatic dialogue between the ISI and RAW. Neither of them appeared to have been aware of the previous history of such a dialogue arranged at the initiative of the West Asian leader.

However, New Delhi was so bitter about the ISI role in orchestrating the blasts which killed about 350 innocent men, women and children that it did not respond positively to the separate offers from the US and China.

Our experience with para-diplomacy through the intelligence agencies with Pakistan has thus been unsatisfactory. However, memories of the past exercise need not deter us from trying it again after a careful examination of the implications at this moment. If a political decision in favour of another try is taken, the head of RAW should be able to work out the mechanics.

B Raman, former head of counter-terrorism, Research and Analysis Wing, is currently director, Institute for Topical Studies.

B Raman