What really happened at Boraibari?

There are two versions. One claims a force of about 240 men, under the command of Deputy Commandant Mondal, is said to have undertaken a mission to capture Boraibari. It was, evidently, ill-advised and undertaken without proper preparation.

This version raises a major question. If, out of this force, 20 men were ambushed in the marshy paddy fields of Boraibari, what were the rest doing? A well-armed team of 240 men is a formidable force. It could have easily defended itself against a few well-armed BDR men, reinforced by a thousand civilians. The latter had nothing but dhaos with them; the BSF could have at least opted for a tactical withdrawal. Firing should have certainly been resorted to, when lynching and/or capture by a hostile BDR-mob combine became evident. But, as reported by the media, the BSF did not resort to weapons. This is perplexing.

I do not buy the BSF's gun-jamming story; they said their jawans were lying, with their weapons, in knee-deep water in the paddy fields. The Ishapur rifles are made to pass this very test -- of being able to fire accurately after being immersed in mud and water.

And why wasn't there any back-up, heavy weapons support? Under such circumstances, the use of the army could have been justified. In fact, we should have reserved the army for an 'if needed basis'; then we would have been prepared for a contingency such as this. It also means the use of helicopters for observation/evacuation/retreat/aerial fire and artillery support should have been considered. If the BSF had planned a three-company attack, then some of these support elements should have been included.

Some rumours say the BDR was forewarned by smugglers in the area, which is why the BSF's advance guard manoeuvre in Boraibari walked into the ambush. To me, it appears almost certain that the entire operation plan was leaked or, more likely, reported through espionage to Bangladesh. This is why the BDR were able to ambush the BSF, frustrate its designs and capture its platoon. They must have known that our force had strict orders not to fire on civilians. Yes, we often tie the hands of our forces and then send them into action.

Of the 20-man platoon under Mondal's direct command, only two jawans were able to escape and return to India; 18 were taken captive. Sixteen of the prisoners were tortured and murdered; the remaining two, who were severely beaten, were taken to Dhaka on the pretext of giving them treatment. I believe, though, that the entire purpose was to interrogate them and try and make them sign confessions. These two men have since returned to India and are now recouping in a hospital in Meghalaya.

It is interesting to note that these seriously injured men were not flown from Dhaka to Calcutta for appropriate medical treatment. Instead, they were transported to Meghalaya in an uncomfortable Assam Rifles helicopter to a nondescript hospital for further treatment and recuperation. Obviously, it is now the turn of the BSF bigwigs and the IB sleuths to interrogate them and tutor them as to what to say and, more important, what not to say. The media is, till then, barred from meeting these injured men who are said to be in a 'state of trauma'.

While the media is beginning to believe that a three-company attack is actually what happened, there is another possibility. The Indian patrol might have strayed and was captured; it is possible that there was no large-scale attack planned by the BSF. We don't know the truth yet.

Be that as it may, it was downright criminal on the part of the BDR to have tortured and murdered our captured jawans; even the theory of a three-company BSF attack does not mitigate their behaviour. It is to the credit of the Indian jawans, and Mondal, that they did not fire on the civilians even under those conditions though, to my mind, it was stupid not to have used weapons in self-defence. They paid for this kindness with excruciating pain and, finally, their lives.

The Fazlur Rahman factor

The BDR's sudden aggressive action is said to be on the orders of its director general, Major General Fazlur Rahman; the Sheikh Hasina government claims it was not consulted by him. They say it was local adventurism or a larger conspiracy to discredit her government and party on the eve of national elections, as the entire opposition has united against her. She is perceived by the opposition, the fundamentalists and the India-haters as having an India-tilt and her enemies would like to portray her as India's stooge.

Rahman, in the meanwhile, made overly aggressive, irreverent, anti-India statements, which were totally uncalled for. His behaviour in India in the recent past, when he was here to attend a conference, was said to be similarly strange, aggressive and rude. He would come late for official functions. He is said to have apologised after the heat was turned on, but neither the Indian government nor his own is likely to let him get away with that.

Torture, mutilation and cold-blooded murder

If the torture and the murders had not taken place, this incident, though undesirable in nature, could have ended with expressions of regret and a return to the status quo ante. But we received specific information from the two escaped jawans that the captured officers and jawans were tortured and murdered by their BDR captors. They even allowed the locals to lynch some of them. This information was proved accurate when their bodies were returned. Deputy Commandant Mondal was murdered barely a few hours before the bodies were handed over. Obviously, it was done to snuff out any direct witnesses to the torture and the murders.

What surprises me is how the BDR -- the border guards of a friendly nation which should be obliged to us for more than one favour -- went ahead with this beastly torture, mutilation and murder.

Why are we always at the receiving end of such incidents?

The Pakistani army had done the same thing to our soldiers who were taken prisoner during the Kargil battle. What did we do about it? Did we demand action against the guilty? Did we take the matter to the human rights commission and vigorously pursue it? Did we take up the matter in every international forum and display the deep wounds the nation had suffered due the shameful acts of cowards? Did we indicate we were not ready to let the matter die unless the guilty were punished? Did we ask the International Court of Justice or any such body to take action against Pakistan and demand compensation? Did we show our will to punish Pakistan for her disgraceful crime?

In effect, did the nation really feel wounded about the treatment meted out to our proud sons who had braved and suffered extreme torture, defilement and death by murder while defending their motherland's honour? Is this the way the nation should honour its heroes?

The result is there for all to see!

Now, we have again seen the capture, torture and murder of our jawans at the hands of a friendly nation's border police. Even a nation which is tiny enough to be crushed at will by our forces, which cannot afford the economic cost of such hostilities, dares to attempt such a dastardly act. That should indicate the low esteem in which our enemies hold us.

It is our own weak-kneed politics which is to be blamed for the treatment meted out to us. Those who do not know how to respect themselves will be put to shame again and again.

I am, therefore, very much in agreement with the complaint lodged by the BSF against the BDR in the international court. The diplomatic moves to ease the tension can continue, but the action demanded against the BDR for the crimes committed by them is very much in order and must be vigorously pursued. Even if it is belated, we should pursue similar measures against Pakistan for its much-worse crimes in Kargil.

What we should have done?

The case of Pyrdiwah's occupation, though serious, should have been dealt with on a diplomatic level; then, no lives would have been lost. An aggressive diplomatic offensive, with a military build-up to back our seriousness, was precisely what was called for.

If we were so serious about retaliation, we should have ascertained the facts and then mounted a strong local attack at lightening speed, backed by heavy artillery weapons, on both the BDR-occupied post at Pyrdiwah and the Bangladeshi build-up pad and inflicted heavy punishment on the Bangladeshi forces. They were said to be concentrated there, which made them a good artillery target.

Whatever was planned for Boraibari should have been undertaken with proper support, will and determination. There can be no half-hearted action. After the Boraibari failure -- and in the light of the brutalisation of our captured soldiers -- we should have used our artillery to inflict punishment. We must demonstrate that we mean business, and tolerance is not the only thing we are good at.

Alternatively -- and this is possible even now -- we should ask Bangladesh to take appropriate and transparent action against the culprits. We should warn them that if they refuse, or if the action taken is not to our satisfaction, we will be compelled to take severe punitive action. Side-by-side, we must build up our forces for offensive action. We should show we have our will and determination to follow our threat through.

Yet another option, based on the premise that a conspiracy is being hatched against Sheikh Hasina, is to start secret operations with the active co-operation of the Bangladesh government. The aim of this operation would be to get all the adventurers they suspect of plotting against them, including those guilty of the heinous crime against our BSF men. During the course of this operation, we should, wherever possible, wipe out a sizeable number of recognised anti-Indian/ pro-ISI elements. Dhaka must also be warned to keep its Muslim fundamentalists under check.

If there is a price to be paid for this, let us be ready to pay it. We have to smash the anti-Indian mischief-makers some day. Their tribe is increasing in the small, little countries that are our neighbours.

President John F Kennedy had once said: "There are risks and costs to a programme of action. But they are far less than the long-term risks and costs of comfortable inaction."

While the politics of helping a friendly Sheikh Hasina government and the Awami League may be given due consideration within reasonable limits, our priority, of necessity, must be to uphold the nation's honour. The Sheikh Hasina government cannot be allowed to get away with the excuse of local adventurism by a few black sheep interested in embarrassing them. It all the more stands to reason for her government to take strong action against the culprits. That may not be easy for her, but we cannot afford to be weak-willed for her sake. I am afraid there is no alternative to strong-arm tactics here.

Media criticism

The government has been severely criticised for soft-pedalling this issue. Equally severe criticism has been directed at the government for the alleged attack on Boraibari. On the one hand, the country wants the government to be aggressive and brook no nonsense. On the other, we blame them for aggression and botched operations. Both can't be done at the same time. Aggressive action always comes with an inherent element of risk.

If the BSF failed to plan the operation correctly, that matter has to be dealt with separately. The government in New Delhi can't plan an attack on some nondescript border post. Those who planned it, however, must be held responsible and made to pay for their blunders. We have to learn our lessons from what happened at Pyrdiwah and make sure we don't repeat our mistakes.

More facets

It is quite clear that the BSF is no longer functioning under the proud tradition of K F Rustomji, the illustrious creator of this force. At the Bangladesh border, they are known to act in cahoots with all kinds of criminals to make money. Rumours indicate this illegal money reaches every level of the force. At least claims to such effect are said to be made by the lower levels while demanding and justifying higher amounts in bribes.

Judging from the media reports, the BSF appears to have become an object of hatred for the population living on both the sides of the border. Such a force can never hold its head high nor maintain its required operational efficiency. There is a crying need, therefore, to cleanse this force urgently and mercilessly. After sorting out the mess with Bangladesh, the government must get onto this job earnestly. There is no time to be lost.

The BSF, according to a senior official, has become adept at creating convincing stories in their defence or in creating circumstances/diversions in their favour. Keeping in mind the sympathy resulting from the gruesome murder of the BSF jawns, they may attempt to defend their actions. The government must not allow them any room for such a manoeuvre, lest this elite force becomes uncontrollable, unaccountable and unanswerable.

Apart from a specific enquiry into this incident, there has to be a major investigation into the BSF formations deployed at the Bangladesh border. All wrongdoers should be brought to book. A failure to do so will entail a very heavy price from us at a future date.

I am afraid it is a tightrope walk for us. We must honour the dead and give due sympathy to their families in full measure. At the same time, we must investigate the incident fully and punish those responsible, without allowing sympathy to mitigate the circumstances which led to this sorry episode.

Notwithstanding any insistence that Bangladesh dish out severe punishments to those involved in the torture and murder of our jawans, we must, at the same time, discipline our force without hesitation. Then and then alone will we be able to keep our forces in a state of peak efficiency as the guardians of our frontiers.

Design: Lynette Menezes

Check out our Full Coverage of the Bangladeshi intrusion.

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