Part 3

Is India ready for a CDS?

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In his first appearance before the media after dismissing Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, then defence minister George Fernandes assured that the defence establishment would be restructured to include the armed forces in the decision-making loop within 30 days.

That was in December 1998. Two years on, the promise is yet to be kept.

In the last week of February 2001, senior ministers under Union Home Minister L K Advani accepted the Arun Singh Committee recommendations. But critics say the report -- which, among other things, endorses a chief of defence staff and the setting up of a command system for nuclear weapons -- could find itself in the cold storage.

"There are more proposals awaiting implementation than those implemented," says an army officer in disgust.

However, there is another camp that believes that since the ministers have accepted the report, it is as good as done. "Cabinet approval is a mere formality," says an official closely involved with the committee.

THERE are many obstacles in implementing the report. For one, the bureaucracy will not be amenable to losing control. Then, there are internal disputes in the armed forces about the concept of CDS.

From the very beginning, there have been reservations about the move within the forces. All throughout, the Indian Air Force has objected to a CDS, fearing that the post would always go to the Army, given its mammoth size.

Air Chief Marshal (retired) S K Kaul says that in so many words: "Somehow [it was] the Army [that] always felt the need for a CDS, and that an Army officer should always be the CDS."

Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw is among the many who feel that an army official should be the CDS. During the Arun Singh Committee's interaction with 16 retired armed forces chiefs in Delhi last year, he had said so in unequivocal terms.

ACM (retired) Kaul says that joint operations need proper planning to be cost-effective. For that, a central authority is necessary.

"One needs to have an organisation that suits one's situation," observes Air Chief Marshal (retired) Arjan Singh. He feels that an organisation to control the nuclear weapons is needed.

"No foreign system can be transplanted. We have different ethos, and any system that we put in place should suit the Indian temperament," says Lt General (retired) V K Sood. He says the apprehensions of Navy and Air Force can be removed by having a transparent system of selecting the CDS.

Major General (retired) Ashok Mehta believes that the government would have a rotational system for the prime appointment wherein the three services would get equal chances.

Meanwhile, the Air Force is discussing setting up a strategic air command for control and delivery of nuclear weapons, though the government has not made its mind clear. The only available delivery platform for India's nuclear weapons is with the Air Force: fighters. But it is acknowledged that an aircraft does not have reliable second-strike capability.

The Air Force also wants the nuclear-tipped missiles under the proposed strategic command. The Army, which presently controls the Prithvi missiles, says its organisation is capable of commanding that weapon.

"Both missiles and aircraft are not the final answer to our search for second-strike capability. It is nuclear submarines, which are least susceptible to detection," argues a senior naval officer.

Unfortunately, India's dream of building a nuclear submarine still remains unfilled despite two decades of work and billions of rupees.

SERVICE officials are apprehensive that with the civilian bureaucracy continuing to play a crucial role, and the three chiefs operationally and administratively powerful, the CDS could become a mere rubber stamp.

"It could go the Pakistan way," says an Army officer. Pakistan's equivalent of a CDS is a ceremonial head.

Those associated with the restructuring, however, argue that the aim of the present exercise is a powerful CDS along the lines of the one in the United States.

The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the US is the operational commander in all its war theatres. All operations are ordered by the president through him.

Meanwhile, there is a section that believes that India is not yet ready for a CDS. ACM (retired) Kaul belongs to this group.

"No doubt at some point a CDS is necessary. But it has to be on a long-term perspective," he says. "At this point of time armed forces officers are not familiar with the other two services because opportunities for gaining such an experience is not there. India needs to build and train our people to be able to take this responsibility."

In his view, India will be ready for a CDS only by 2020. Till then, he is all for allowing the present system of Chiefs of Staff Committee to continue. This committee, he stresses, should jointly render advice to the government.

"Simultaneously at each commander-in-chiefs office, officers of the other two services should be posted," he says.

Even now, a few such arrangements do exist. For instance an Air Vice-Marshal is posted at the Western Army Command. However, he has not much say in matters. Similar is the story of other commands, admit senior officers.

The Arun Singh Committee, for its part, hopes that an overhauled defence establishment, with a fully integrated approach to war, comes through as soon as possible.

Watch this space Monday for the last part of this series.

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