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Pakistan at the Crossroads: The Fallout of Kargil

Speaking to correspondents at Attock where he has been incarcerated by the Musharraf regime, Nawaz Sharif recently squarely blamed General Pervez Musharraf for Pakistan's military and diplomatic debacle in Kargil. Revealing that Pakistan had suffered heavier casualties in its Kargil misadventure than in the entire 1965 conflict, Sharif went on to say: "The fact is that unit after unit of the Northern Light Infantry were wiped out. With every passing day, Pakistan was losing posts."

While the military regime predictably branded Nawaz as a traitor and liar, his wife Kulsoom, whom many in Pakistan consider to be far more politically savvy than her husband, joined the fray, demanding the establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to look into who was responsible for the Kargil debacle.

Influential and highly respected newspapers like The Dawn supported this call. But given the veil of secrecy and absence of public accountability that shrouds every activity of the army, there is no way that General Musharraf is going to oblige those who demand that his actions in Kargil should face the same measure of public "accountability" as the actions of those whom he is now seeking to prosecute.

Many Pakistanis now privately acknowledge that it is the lack of transparency and public accountability that has led to their army becoming a virtual state within a state in their country. It is only after a lapse of over three decades that eminent Pakistanis like Air Marshal Nur Khan and Altaf Gauhar now acknowledge that the 1965 conflict instigated by Bhutto and executed by Ayub was a national disaster rather than the great victory it was claimed to be.

With the country unable to meet its international debt repayment obligations and regarded as a breeding ground for sectarian religious extremism by countries in its neighbourhood ranging from Iran and India to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgystan, there is growing international concern about where Pakistan is headed. This concern is naturally shared by many thinking Pakistanis. But is a regime that sought to present President Clinton's televised address during his brief stopover in Islamabad as an endorsement of its policies, at all capable of genuine introspection?

The military establishment presents the Kargil debacle to its own people as a great military feat whose gains were bartered away by a blundering Nawaz Sharif. One has, therefore, to really ponder over whether the military establishment in Pakistan has learnt any lessons at all from its recent history.

The military, strategic and diplomatic aims of the Kargil misadventure became evident to the world from the two conversations in May 1999, between General Musharraf who was then in China and his Chief of General Staff Aziz Khan. In diplomatic terms the aim was obviously to get waning international interest refocused on Kashmir. The expectation was that India would not be able to retake the heights astride the Srinagar-Leh road and its communications and supply lines to Siachen and Ladakh were cut off.

So confident was Musharraf that these strategic objectives would be achieved that he directed Aziz on May 29 that Pakistan should not accept any Indian offer of a cease-fire in Kargil. Aziz Khan was also ordered that the Pak government should claim that the Line of Control was not properly defined or demarcated and that all military activities should be attributed to the "Muhjahideen".

The tunnel vision of those who planned and executed the Kargil venture soon became apparent. The argument that the LOC was not accurately demarcated was promptly rejected by the USA, the European Union and others who had been provided copies of maps signed by Indian and Pakistani military commanders in 1972. Further, by the end of June, virtually all Pakistan army posts overlooking the vital Srinagar-Leh road were overrun.

When United States CENTCOM Commander General Anthony Zini visited Islamabad towards the end of June, Musharaf realised the game was up. Every strategic post except Tiger Hill had been lost. It needs to be remembered that Nawaz Sharif agreed to meet Zini only after Musharraf had agreed that withdrawal from remaining areas of Kargil was the only viable option left, both militarily and diplomatically.

By the time Nawaz left for his fateful trip to Washington on July 4, the Indian flag was flying on top of Tiger Hill and supply convoys were proceeding unhindered to Leh from Srinagar. Pakistani army intruders, drawn predominantly from the Northern Light Infantry, had been forced out of over 95 per cent of the strategically crucial Dras and Batalik sectors and the Indian army was poised for a major attack in Mashkoh where over 50 per cent of the territory had been cleared of the intruders.

But the weekend meeting between Nawaz and Clinton signaled the beginning of a new and deadly rivalry between Nawaz and Musharraf, over who exactly was responsible for the Kargil misadventure that ended ignominiously in military terms and earned Pakistan a reputation for irresponsible behaviour, internationally.

The fallout of the Kargil episode was inevitable. As Musharraf visited cantonment after cantonment seeking to explain the debacle to sceptical audiences, he inevitably had to claim that he had ordered the withdrawal on instructions from Nawaz Sharif. The Punjabi prime minister was obviously not pleased at this explanation of his Mohajir army chief. Matters came to a head over Musharraf's decision to sack Corps Commander, Quetta, Tariq Parvez for his allegedly unauthorised contacts with the prime minister. The impetuous and rash Nawaz Sharif in turn decided to sack Musharraf. The 111 Brigade in Rawalpindi, on red alert for just such an eventuality struck and Pakistan again slid back to military dictatorship.

One would have hoped that given Musharraf's credentials as a modern minded Ataturk oriented general, things would change. But the repeated invocation of jihad naturally raises serious doubts about the directions in which Pakistan intends to proceed. Has the Pakistan army learnt any lessons at all from the futile deaths of its soldiers and young officers, many of whom bravely laid down their lives for what was, by any yardstick, a military adventure doomed to failure? Was it necessary to get involved in a situation where a professional army refused to accept back the bodies of its slain comrades ? Would the Army high command have been so callous on this score if the soldiers killed were from Chakwal and Rawalpindi instead of from Gilgit and Baltistan?

Finally, has Bill Clinton's admonition that the international community does not reward those who seek to change borders in blood at all sunk into the minds of the military establishment ?

Pakistan and its military rulers today stand at the crossroads of their nation's history. Will they choose the path of their country continuing to be a focal point for jihad in Chechnya, Algeria, Egypt, Central Asia and Kashmir? Will they persist in a sterile and futile quest for "parity" with a neighbour several times their size and further bankrupt their crisis-ridden economy? Or will they choose the path laid down in the SAARC Vision for the Year 2000 and beyond and constructively join a collective endeavour for developing a South Asian Community, dedicated to the progress and welfare of its people?

Gopalaswami Parthasarathy retired from the Indian Foreign Service in May 2000 after a long and distinguished career. He served as India's ambassador/high commissioner to Burma, Australia and finally, Pakistan and at Indian missions in Washington, Moscow, Dar es Salaam and Karachi earlier. In Delhi he served as the spokesman at the ministry of external affairs and as information adviser to then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi. Currently a visiting professor at the Centre for Policy Research, he will contribute a regular column on foreign policy to rediff.com

G Parthasarathy