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The politics of autonomy

The politics of autonomy contains a time-tested survival kit for every Kashmiri politician in trouble. Historically, a whimsical resort to the autonomy slogan has been seen to provide a convenient escape route to the separatist ones whenever they ran out of steam fighting Delhi which, in Kashmiri parlance, is synonymous with 'India'. Correspondingly, it has also proved to be quite effective ammunition in the hands of the nationalist variety wanting to be seen to be standing up to Delhi whenever their own stock was found running low on their home ground.

Sheikh Abdullah in 1975 and his son Farooq Abdullah a quarter century later, are the two illustrative examples. In between them, rank others like Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Ghulam Mohammad (Gul) Shah sought to play this card in the power game.

The substance of the emotive issue, quite different from the tricky politics surrounding it, has a longer history dating back to Maharaja Hari Singh's rule in the second quarter of the last century. Important milestones in autonomy's recent history being : The Instrument of Accession (1947), the Constitutional Order (1950), Delhi Agreement (1952), the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution (1957) and the Kashmir Accord (1975).

Farooq Abdullah's latest gambit is not going to change ground realities. It seems to have created more noise outside than in Kashmir. The only thing one can perceive at the moment is a feeling of some relief among his partymen who feel that Farooq's controversial act might restore some of their lost self-esteem.

The popular quest for autonomy stems primarily from the exclusivist characteristic of Kashmir's psyche which vibes with the geo-political experiences of the local population, particularly the Muslims of Kashmir. That also explains why Kashmiri Muslims, for the first time, took up arms in 1947 (before the arrival of the Indian army) to resist the forcible annexation by their co-religionists from Pakistan, quite contrary to the run of events in the freshly partitioned subcontinent at that time. The pro-independence sentiment in Kashmir's separatist politics flows from this very trait as, indeed, does the spasmodic itch for distancing away from Delhi in the nationalist political camp.

In today's context, however, the dimensions of autonomy are better understood in terms of the Centre-state relationship which, in the case of Kashmir, unlike any other Indian state, has always evoked mutually acrimonious perceptions, not only between Srinagar and Delhi, but also between Srinagar and Jammu as also between Srinagar and Leh (Ladakh).

The author of Kashmir's instrument of accession in 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh, underlined the uniqueness of the Centre-state relationship by specifying that he was surrendering only a limited jurisdiction of his to the Union of India -- defence, foreign affairs and communication. To make its import clear beyond doubt, he put it on record that his government will not be bound by nor committed to any future Constitutional changes ( in the Centre-state jurisdiction) beyond that specified in the instrument of accession. That is precisely what gave birth to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution in 1950 which alone governs the Constitutional part of Jammu and Kashmir's relationship with Delhi and bestows a special status on the state.

The double-ended tussle over autonomy started soon after the political situation began to stabilise, following the United Nations sponsored cease-fire in Kashmir in 1949. Ironically, though the dramatis personae have changed since that time, the features of the contentious issue have not changed much and even the line up of political forces at the two ends, Srinagar and Delhi, remains almost the same.

Much of the debate so far has remained confined to the question whether Article 370 should go or be retained and whether it was a two-way tunnel or just a one-way device to 'import' union laws made by the Parliament into Jammu and Kashmir. In plain language, the debate has been circling around the controversy over so-called erosion of the State's autonomy.

Delhi has it that there is no way to reverse the process of Constitutional integration to seek de-application of post-1953 central laws extended to Jammu and Kashmir. The counter argument is that the (President's) Constitutional authority under Article 370 to extend central laws to Jammu and Kashmir logically implies the authority to 'recall' these laws. Delhi's argument has also been that Article 370 is only a temporary provision in the Constitution of India which the Parliament is competent to do away with.

The other view is that Article 370 itself specifies that it can be abrogated ONLY with the concurrence of Jammu and Kashmir's Constituent Assembly. That Assembly went out of existence in 1957 after adopting the State's separate Constitution and it did not make any recommendation to abrogate Article 370. Hence Article 370 has become a permanent feature.

The Maharaja pursued his pro-independence line between August and October 1947, while trying to avoid his decision on the accession issue. Later, the Sheikh followed with his fond semi-independent agenda till Delhi pressurised him into the 1952 (Delhi) Agreement which for the first time brought the State and the Center together to work out a framework for demarcation of their respective jurisdictions. Retrospectively, it turned out to be the thin end of the wedge. After the Sheikh's undemocratic dismissal from power in 1953, Delhi found it easy to make inroads into the State's jurisdiction, thanks to the dependence of successive rulers in Jammu and Kashmir on Delhi's goodwill. Bakshi, Sadiq and Mir Qasim who succeeded the Sheikh in that order (barring a brief 100 day spell of Shamsuddin in 1964), had no qualms in bartering the State's jurisdiction for their political survival.

Such was the impact of this phenomenon that even a taller Sheikh Abdullah in 1975 preferred to fall in line. His endurance had evidently been exhausted by Indira Gandhi's tough stand on the issue of restoring the pre-1953 level of autonomy which the Sheikh had forcefully articulated as his bottomline for signing the Kashmir Accord. Indira Gandhi's terse response --"The hands of the clock cannot be turned back" -- saw the Sheikh submitting to her terms.

What Farooq is trying to do today is exactly what the Sheikh had sought to belatedly do in the early Eighties when his relations with Indira Gandhi had cooled off shortly after the euphoria over the signing of the 1975 Kashmir accord which restored him to power after 22 years of his dismissal.

Farooq seems to have taken a leaf out of his father's book and, significantly, has gone an important step ahead. While the Sheikh stopped short of seeking the mandate of the state legislature, Farooq chose to cross the Laxman rekha. There are two plausible explanations for why a formidable father did not go as far as his relatively weak successor-son. Firstly, that the dice is more heavily loaded on the home turf against Farooq than was the case with his father. So he had play for higher stakes. Secondly, the Sheikh always nursed a deep seated fear that Indira Gandhi could retaliate vindictively if he tried to upstage her. Farooq, on the other hand, seems to have sized up Delhi's muscle and come to the conclusion that the risk was worth taking at this moment.

The politics of autonomy, rather the substantive issue of autonomy, has gained momentum with the State Assembly's June 26, 2000 resolution , calling upon the Central and State governments to take steps for restoring the pre-1953 level of autonomy. To that extent the Hurriyat Conference will find it difficult to pitch for anything less than Farooq's benchmark. Similarly, Delhi will find it almost impossible to bypass Farooq and make any substantive concession to the Hurriyat, if and when the trumpeted dialogue gets going.

Farooq has given sufficient indication of his timing . He is convinced that America is putting pressure on India and Pakistan to defuse and resolve the Kashmir dispute. He feels that the release of the Hurriyat leaders after the Clinton visit was the thin end of the wedge. His abrupt resort to the trusted "weapon" of autonomy politics is thus a defensive action, more than his suspected bid to undermine Kashmir's Constitutional integration with the Union of India.

Abeer Malik