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The Rediff Interview/Salman Haidar

'The support for the army is widespread'

Ever since Delhi-born General Pervez Musharraf overthrew Nawaz Sharief and seized the reins of power, Indians have been watching the situation closely. While somewhat surprised at the alacrity with which most Pakistanis have welcomed the coup d'etat, New Delhi remains apprehensive about the impact on future Indo-Pak ties with the army at the helm in Islamabad.

Former foreign secretary Salman Haidar visited Pakistan earlier this month. In a free-wheeling interview to Amberish K Diwanji, he records his impressions about the turn of events in Pakistan and its likely implications.

Let us start with the reason for your visit to Pakistan.

I had gone to Pakistan as part of the ongoing Track 2 diplomatic effort. This process was started by Shirin Tahir-Kheli, a lady of Indo-Pak origin -- originally from India, then in Pakistan -- and who then moved to the United States, where she worked for the National Security Council. She has an abiding interest in South Asian affairs and decided to seriously address Indo-Pak issues by arranging discussions on a Track 2 effort.

One has to be cautious when talking about Track 2 diplomacy. It is not part of the government's effort to promote cultural or people-to-people ties. It is a sort of a self-generated effort involving talks between groups comprising eminent citizens from both sides.

In this meeting, the first after Kargil and after army rule was imposed, we held forthright discussions in an open atmosphere. As part of the understanding, we don't attribute the statements made. But the fact that we did meet was refreshing, to see how India and Pakistan could once again engage each other and understand each other's views.

The Indian side made it clear that given the way in which the Pakistani establishment was involved in Kargil and that the military takeover had had a deep impact on India the possibility of restarting contact was more difficult. We felt that certain initiatives were necessary from the Pakistani side.

Also, considering the stage where we are right now, it is not very clear how stable the present regime in Pakistan will be and whether it can address policies concerning the country.

Let us now come to that. You were in Pakistan for over a week (November 2 to 9). What is your assessment of the situation there? There have been reports that army rule has actually been welcomed by the Pakistanis.

We go with our own biases, which I believe are the biases of history in favour of democracy. So it is very curious for us as Indians to find among the Pakistanis -- or at least among the section that we were in contact with -- a genuine welcome for the army. And this seemed to reflect the complete lack of credibility and authority to which the Nawaz Sharief regime had sunk. The sense was -- at least at the kind of elite level that we were talking to -- that the institutions of Pakistan had been debased and that the only institution intact, that remained unviolated was the army. Thus there was this broad support for the army.

Now if one looks deeper into this alleged process of misuse and decay of institutions, I don't think all of us would have been convinced that this had actually happened. But this was the sentiment that we encountered.

Did this sentiment cut across the different sections of Pakistani society?

Yes, it did. The support for the army is widespread. There was genuine satisfaction that the army had taken over and it continues to enjoy prestige. That is quite visible. Of course, there is the fact that when we were there, the new regime had not yet shown its true colours. Hence, people saw in the new regime and its statements what they wished to see. The new regime till then had not been obliged to take steps that would create antagonisms or enter into awkward choices, which are inevitable.

There was considerable interest among the elite there about the new appointments being made, whether of ambassadors or provincial governors. To us it just appeared to be a reshuffle, made by chance or choice.

What really was intriguing was the sort of collective amnesia that had taken place. It was almost like having turned the page from the Nawaz Sharief era, all that which happened during his rule was expunged, as if it had never happened. That was not something for us Indians who happened to be there to take quite in the same spirit. The lingering impact of Kargil and questions about democracy were much stronger with us.

Pakistan faces many challenges ahead on various fronts. Did you get the perception that the Pakistani establishment is aware of the tasks ahead?

Certainly, the Pakistani establishment was well aware of the tasks that lie ahead. They also realise that the focus of the challenge is not so much external as internal, in formulating coherent policies for economic development and addressing other issues that the earlier government had not addressed sufficiently.

Do you see democracy returning to Pakistan?

The Pakistanis we spoke to did not expect democracy back in Pakistan for at least three years or so. They are giving it a long span. Even the political parties are behaving very cautiously. They may make statements, but they do not see any occasion for coming out in opposition to the present rulers.

You mentioned the political parties keeping quiet. Yet, it is now apparent that the political leadership across the spectrum stands extremely discredited in Pakistan, being seen as thoroughly corrupt.

You are quite right. But then there is the inherent difficulty in coping with the massive corruption, the huge defrauding of the state that exists in Pakistan. In fact, even as we are speaking, the deadline for the big borrowers and creditors to return their loans is lapsing. I was told -- I don't know if it is true and I was not told this in Pakistan -- that the total outstanding credit of Pakistan is around Rs 20 billion, and of that, Rs 15 billion has already left the country! Getting this money back is not easy.

An article that I read while in Pakistan said that the government had planned to go after the big borrowers but will be forced to lower its sights since all the big borrowers had left the country. Only the small borrowers remain behind.

Why is the government of India so obsessed with democracy in Pakistan, especially this time round? New Delhi was not so bothered with General Zia-ul Haq's coup.

I can't really speak on behalf of the government. But I can understand that to a considerable extent, our concerns are forced. If there is a military takeover in Pakistan, Indian instincts are against it. But this time there is a certain animus. We have asked that the South Asian summit be postponed and at the Commonwealth meet we put Pakistan in the dock.

Is it justified? You can argue in favour of India's position. After all, the chief personalities in the new regime have been responsible for the misadventure in Kargil which hurt India and took bilateral relations to a new low. There is a kind of longer memory on our side of the border, unlike in Pakistan where Sharief seems to be forgotten.

Where do you see Indo-Pakistan relations now?

I see it in a state of suspension for quite some time. There is also the fact, as reported in the newspapers, that India's position is that we will talk only after the infiltration in Kashmir and cross-border terrorism is stopped, and verified that it is stopped.

If we take too hard a line, it might suggest that we will talk only when Kashmir is settled on our terms, which would suggest that some individuals or groups on our side feel that we are in a position where we can dictate terms. On the Pakistani side, the view is that it is business as usual and the two sides must engage in talks as they had earlier.

So as we can see, both sides have different views regarding the legitimacy of the regime, its longevity and the issues at stake. Given the difference, I don't see much progress in Indo-Pak talks. In fact, in some of their most recent statements, one sees a certain hardening of attitude.

What is the Pakistani view of their own economic situation?

One very interesting development was the realisation among the Pakistani establishment that the country needed to do things differently to tackle its economic difficulties, that it needed a fresh view to overhaul the economy.

One view, which may have existed earlier but is being expressed more openly now is that trade with India was a positive factor that could only benefit Pakistan. I am not too sure whether this rather radical revision of traditional views will be welcomed, but the fact is that it is there and has been expressed by some of them.

Anything else that you noticed of particular interest during your discussions in Pakistan?

One point I would like to make is that there was this visible impatience with the country's Afghanistan policy. In the sense that, encouragement for the fundamentalists -- the Taliban -- was seen as not being conducive for Pakistan's well being.

Talking of fundamentalists, do you think the religious parties will gain under army rule?

The religious parties do have street strength. In fact, even as we were there, the Lashkar-e-Toiba had a meeting where their leaders made some bloodcurdling remarks about India and vowed to fight on against India. There was also a very big meeting of the Tablighi Jamaat, which is a very different sort of organisation. We should not confuse the Tablighi with the Lashkar, the former being a religious group that has its headquarters in Delhi, but also a fundamentalist group that harks back to the fundamentals of the religion while the Lashkar-e-Toiba is really a militant group.

But the fact that both these groups had huge meetings in Lahore do tell a story about the religious sentiments in Pakistan, distorted or not, but certainly with a militant cutting edge. There was no attempt to disguise the militancy in their speeches.

Do you see the army also coming under the fundamentalists' influence or will it be able to stay clear?

I think the army will stay as it is. Which means that they will use the fundamentalists as and when it suits them, but will not permit these sentiments to infiltrate the ranks. The army has its own structure that has not been corroded so far as I can see. The army does give the impression of being securely under the control of its senior officers, the army hierarchy still rules.

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