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The Rediff Special/Lieutenant General (Retd) Ashok Joshi

Armed Intrusion in the Kargil Sector: a Perspective

The presence of several hundred armed intruders from Pakistan in the Kargil sector has left most Indians perplexed and angered. Realisation has now dawned that it is going to take several weeks to push back the intruders, and the cost of Indian counteractions is going to be substantial. The possibility, though distant, of further escalation, which might lead to an all-out war between the two countries, continues to be a cause for worry, and not only for those who live in the Indian sub continent.

*What does Pakistan hope to achieve from this act of aggression?

*Why has Pakistan chosen to resort to armed intrusion into Jammu and Kashmir even before the ink has dried on the Lahore Declaration signed by the two prime ministers in February 1999? It will be recalled that the Lahore Declaration contained a specific clause that "on Kashmir, the two sides shall intensify efforts to resolve all issues."

*Why has Pakistan selected the Kargil sector for intrusion?

*And, why has it chosen to use the mercenaries and others for this adventure?

A caveat must precede further analysis, which attempts to seek answers to these questions. Analysis of adversary's intentions is a subjective exercise and rather speculative in nature. Conclusions drawn on that basis are unlikely to be vindicated in entirety by subsequent happenings and events.

Besides, if a 'supreme intelligence' were to conceive of the grand design, and preside over its implementation, there would be a totality of consistency in logic, a lack of internal contradictions in design, and complete coherence in execution of plans.

But such is not the case at the national level. And some internal contradictions and inconsistencies are only to be expected. And these tend to obscure the central design. In spite of both these limitations, the need for such an exercise still exists because it may give a glimpse of the future, though somewhat hazy, and perhaps, distorted.

The happenings in the Kargil sector could be examined with respect to tactics, strategy, and policy orientation of Pakistan.

It makes very good sense in mountains to pre-empt and occupy features of tactical importance and construct defence-works, rather than to attack and dislodge the adversary. Advantages of pre-emption increase rapidly with steeply rising hill features, pronounced grain of the terrain, altitude higher than the ten thousand mark -- above which long acclimatisation is necessary -- and general lack of development and paucity of roads.

The number of men required for dislodging the occupants increases disproportionately. And so does the associated logistic burden. The time required for marshalling and positioning resources for attacking prepared defences goes up. Unless the defender is surprised, in some manner, he is likely to impose numerous casualties on the attacker. A long wait may have to be accepted by the attacker in order to create possibilities for achieving surprise.

Under these conditions, only highly trained and acclimatised troops can be effective. Apart from problems of availability of suitable troops, and intrinsic superiority in material, the terrain severely restricts the number of troops, which can be employed at the cutting edge. Tactically important features with prepared and unoccupied defence-works present golden opportunity for pre-emptive seizure.

The Kargil sector presented such an opportunity, which seems to have been exploited. The tactical advantages of pre-emption are not restricted to mountains, or underdeveloped terrain. In the days of the Cold War, the NATO always feared that the Soviet airborne forces would do just that.

Strategically, the Kargil sector seems to offer some advantages.

*Success, or even partial success in this sector, can be used to threaten the alternative route to the Kashmir Valley. It may be recounted that isolation of Jammu and Kashmir in general, and of the Kashmir Valley in particular, has been an obsession with Pakistan. In 1965 as well as 1971 the deliberate thrusts aimed at Akhmur were meant to achieve this purpose.

*This sparsely populated area, contiguous to Skardu, is amenable to absorption in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. Once under the control of tribesmen, it may be used to surround and isolate the Valley from Ladakh. The need for such control and isolation would have relevance in a future contingency to which we would revert later.

*Should a need arise to discuss proposals for 'demilitarisation' of Siachen, a secure position in the Kargil sector could be used as a leverage to obtain the desired concessions from India.

Foreign policy orientation of Pakistan with regard to India in general and Kashmir in particular has remained steady and unwavering because it draws upon beliefs that are largely shared by a large proportion of its population, cutting across all divides.

In a letter dated December 30, 1947, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan wrote to the prime minister of India giving his perception of what vitiated India-Pakistan relations; inter alia, he stated the following:

*"The Pakistan government has not accepted and cannot accept the so-called 'accession' of the Jammu and Kashmir state of India."

*"(I)n view of this background it would not be surprising if some nationals of Pakistan were taking part in the struggle for the liberation of Kashmir along with the forces of the Azad Kashmir government. You must have already heard of an International Brigade composed of representatives of many nations in the world who are likewise fighting on the side of the Azad Kashmir government."

*"In other words, Pakistan's very existence is the chief casus belli so far as India is concerned." More than 50 years and three major conflicts later, Najam Sethi, a Pakistani journalist, otherwise liberal in outlook and open minded, said in an answer to a question at New Delhi, at Pakistan-India Center that Pakistan would "never accept the Line of Control as an international border."

The vehemence may come as a bit of a surprise to most Indians. The leadership in India, with few exceptions, has accepted the reality of Pak Occupied Kashmir. The Shimla Agreement bears a testimony to this.

Except for rare assertions in anger, no one in authority in India has ever said that India intends to secure for itself all of Jammu and Kashmir. It will be recalled that Narasimha Rao, in the course of his address from the ramparts of the Red Fort, and A B Vajpayee in face of aggression in Kargil said so.

It appears that Pakistan looks upon India as a revisionist state, bent upon absorbing Pakistan within its fold, not having ever accepted the two-nation theory that brought Pakistan into being. Muslim majority areas of the Indian sub continent, according to Pakistan, have no place in India, and it looks upon accession of Jammu and Kashmir as a fraud brought about by deceit and force.

Allowing India to retain even portions of Jammu and Kashmir that have a Muslim majority is repugnant not only to the leadership of Pakistan, but also to common man in that country.

India is willing to live with the Line of Control. But for Pakistan, LoC represents a defeat of the two-nation theory. Pakistan, as a major concession to ground realities may concede to India, when pushed to the wall those areas of Jammu and Kashmir in which Muslims are not in majority namely much of Jammu region or Ladakh for that matter.

The feeling in Pakistan for the securing of the Muslim majority areas is very strong and any compromise in this matter is seen as conceding a victory to India. It is for this reason that the Pakistani leadership finds it very convenient to ride a popular movement in support of securing the valley and other areas of Jammu and Kashmir where either Muslims are in majority, or in such dominating position that they can force out the minorities.

Warlike tribesmen of the Northwest have remained feudal in outlook and have a long tradition of organising military expeditions entirely on their own. With a little help and inducement from the Pakistan government, they are more than willing to undertake forays into territories that hold out hopes of good fights, loot, and a chance to mete out just desserts to the unbelievers.

As early as September 1947 armed tribesmen and others had started raiding the territory of the then state of Jammu and Kashmir. ''Tribesmen, attracted by opportunities of foot and plunder afforded by the British withdrawal, swung into action under the noble pretext of saving their Muslim brethren. While it is not possible to establish what understandings, if any, were given to the tribesmen by the central government in Karachi, there is now not the least doubt that the incursions were actively encouraged if not organised by it.'' ( India's White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, pages -- 129-134)

Short of full-scale operations by the regulars, induction of armed infiltrators, stiffened and led by hardcore professionals offers an attractive course of action to Pakistan. Advantages are many: deniability of responsibility for atrocities and other acts of omission and commission by the tribesmen and other freelancers, avoidance of national embarrassment in the event of major failures, very little accountability to those who actually fight and die, and comparatively reduced costs of operations.

No wonder that Pakistan began its adventures in Jammu and Kashmir in October 1947 by using these means. One Major Khurshid Anver led nearly 13,000 armed tribesmen into the valley. These were mostly Pathans, out of the total of some 80,000 that had gathered for jehad in various centers of Pakistan.

Pakistani regulars 'on leave' provided the leadership. Eventually, Major Anver was wounded, and replaced by one Colonel Akbar. Recruitment of tribesmen and their arming had initially been done by the civil officials of the North West Frontier Province under instructions from the chief minister--then called premier -- of that province.

"It was generally believed that Pakistan army regulars were no more than five percent of the total strength of the Azad army. But as Russel K Haight, an ex-officer of the American army, who had been fighting with Azad forces, reported, the real importance of the Pakistani military personnel was far 'greater than their numbers since they perform(ed) supply and organisational functions.' In his opinion it would have been impossible for the Azad Kashmir government to maintain a fighting force ... (if) not for the substantial assistance it received from the Northwest Frontier Provincial Government." (Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, Cambridge University press, 1990, pages 57-58)

Then again, in 1965, raiders -- now called the Mujahideen -- led and supported by professionals, made forays deep into the valley and in Punch Rajouri sectors. Supplies for them were dropped by parachutes at prearranged areas deep inside Jammu and Kashmir for a limited period of time, and in limited areas in depth.

They attempted to establish an 'Azad' government. India retaliated by capturing posts in Kargil sector. Pakistan launched their major offensive in Akhnur sector with a view to isolating Jammu and Kashmir and in the firm belief that India would restrict the conflict to Jammu and Kashmir, as they had done in 1947-48, no matter what the provocation.

Kargil Intrusion: Old Wine in New Bottle. General Joshi's article continues

Lieutenant General (retd) Ashok Joshi has served in the Punj-Rajouri sector of Kashmir.

The Rediff Specials

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