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The Rediff Special/ Admiral (retd) J G Nadkarni

Raising the Nuclear Threshold

Between Kargil and cricket, a small news item, which will have, in the long term, serious implications on India's security, did not receive the attention it deserved. And yet, very shortly this piece of information will have an overwhelming and lasting effect on the happy-go-lucky people of Bombay.

The news item, datelined Moscow, stated that the Pakistan Navy was on the threshold of "going nuclear." Reading between the lines it means that the Pak Navy is likely introduce nuclear weapons at sea, most probably in its submarines.

To those who have watched developments in the submarine arm of the Pakistan Navy over 30-odd years, the news came as no surprise. It is in fact the ultimate and logical conclusion to a programme going back to 1965. Up to that year, both India and Pakistan had resisted any attempts to introduce the underwater element in their fleets. It was Pakistan, which broke that unwritten agreement with the aid and assistance of the United States.

Pakistan extracted a heavy price for joining the Cento and the Seato pacts by getting the Americans, not only to train its submarine branch personnel in the United States but also to supply it with a World War II sub, the Ghazi.

The arrival of the Ghazi in the Arabian Sea disturbed the military equation between the two countries and spurred the Indian Navy on to establish its own submarine arm. In the 1965 Indo-Pak war the Ghazi, probably to justify its introduction, claimed to have sunk the Indian Navy frigate Brahmaputra. The commanding officer was decorated, before an embarrassed Pakistan Navy saw the Brahmaputra paraded in front of foreign journalists at Bombay.

By 1999 both countries had spent hundreds of millions of rupees on the submarine arms race. India's request for submarines was spurned by both Britain and the United States, forcing her to turn eastwards in what was to become a long and prosperous arms alliance with the Soviet Union. So far she has received eight Foxtrot class and ten Kilo class submarines from the latter. This fleet has been augmented by the purchase and construction of four HDW class of submarines.

In 1992 Pakistan signed a Rs 45,000 million-contract with DCN of France for the supply of three Agusta 90-B submarines, the first of which has already been commissioned. Not only is the Agusta a modern conventional submarine, it is also fitted with the latest Air Independent Propulsion System.

The Achilles heel of a conventional submarine is that it has to surface once in about 24 hours to charge her batteries. During this period it is vulnerable to detection by the enemy. The AIPS-fitted submarine can remain submerged for five to six days without having to surface. In the notorious waters of the Indian Ocean, the AIPS can give the Pakistani subs near-total immunity from detection. The Indian Navy does not at present have any submarine fitted with AIPS.

Submarine-launched missiles can either be strategic or tactical. Both Russia and the United States, along with Britain and France have submarines carrying strategic missiles targeted at each other. The Americans have replaced the original Polaris missiles with the Tridents capable of a range in excess of 3,000 miles. Each Trident can carry up to ten independently targeted warheads. The Russians have their equivalent missiles of equal range and potency.

The Harpoon falls in the tactical missile area. It has a limited range of about 120 kilometres and is normally fitted with a 250 kilogram HE warhead meant for targeting surface ships. However, in the west, plans and equipment exist to fit it with a miniaturised tactical nuclear warhead. The yield of such a weapon cannot be more than a few kilotonnes. It is specifically meant to be used against ship concentrations and convoys.

Pakistan has another major advantage over the Indian Navy at present. It is well known that the United States has supplied Pakistan with all versions of the Harpoon missile, the surface-launched, the air-launched and the submarine-launched. The submarine-launched version, which can be fired from below the sea can target ships, convoys or even shore targets up to about 100 kilometres.

Pakistan, obviously, did not spend such a huge amount of precious foreign exchange on acquiring new submarines, merely to have them launch conventional missiles and torpedoes. They had a long-term strategy in mind for the use of these subs.

At the time of concluding the contract with France in 1992 Pakistan's nuclear capability was not known. However, after May 1998, that is no longer in any doubt. It is also not beyond the realm of possibility, especially with technical help from China and North Korea, for Pakistan to be able to miniaturise and marry the Harpoon with a small nuclear warhead of a few kilotonnes.

The entire efforts of the Pak Navy are obviously concentrated on acquiring such a capability. Once they successfully achieve the feat, lucrative targets on India's west coast such as the Tarapur atomic power station, the clustered oil production platforms of Bombay High, the Dabhol power station and even the metropolis of Bombay itself can be zeroed in. One does not require a high-yield thermo-nuclear weapon to be launched against Bombay. Even a crude, small two to ten kilotonne low-yield weapon, launched from 50 kilometres, can cause thousands of casualties and totally immobilise the city.

Bombay, which has so far escaped coming under a threat in both World Wars as well as in the many Indo-Pak conflicts, is destined to become the prime target for a nuclear-tipped submarine-launched Harpoon missile in the 21st century. No longer will it be possible for the citizens of this mighty city to sleep without fear. In a way, the city will join the elite club of cities, which are targeted by both the west and the east in the nuclear game.

Reacting to the news item about the Pakistan Navy going nuclear, the chief of naval staff reassured the public that the Indian Navy was prepared for a nuclear conflict. Indeed, naval ships have been equipped to pass through a nuclear fallout for more than 40 years.

Which basically means that the ships' personnel are protected within the 'citadel' while passing through a radioactive fallout and can remerge to fight once the fallout on the superstructure is washed off. However, the Indian Navy, at present at least, has no known capability to deliver an underwater nuclear missile. Systems and weapons, are, no doubt, under development but there is no indication that any are in deployment.

Unfortunately, the only way to prevent a sub-launched Pak nuclear attack is to have in place India's own sub-based second strike capability. Bombay or for that matter any target on the west coast can be relatively immune from a nuclear attack only when the other side is certain that the price for such an attack will be Karachi. However, Strangelovian the whole scenario may look, short of an agreement removing all nuclear weapons from the sea, nuclear deterrence and a second strike capability is the only remedy against Pakistan's efforts to introduce nuclear weapons at sea.

The navy's way ahead is clear. To start with, it must bring its own nuclear-powered submarine programme out of the closet. In any case, the Bhagwat affair has blown off most of the fig leaf. Secondly, it must expedite our own sea-launched missile programme and be ready to have in place a second strike capability from the sea. The Pak sea-based threat is here and real. We cannot afford another Kargil-type lapse at sea.

Admiral J G Nadkarni (retired), former chief of the naval staff, is a frequent contributor to rediff.com

J G Nadkarni

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