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The Rediff Special/ Prem Panicker

Mr Vajpayee, did it finally take a thermonuclear explosion to blast Jayalalitha out of your hair?

Thermonuclear explosions, even subterranean ones, have surface resonances. Or, to downshift from the pedantic gear, they kick up a heck of a dust.

The ones India loosed off in Pokharan, on May 11 and May 13, has kicked up more than its share. And through the dust haze, what I see is a kind of hysterical celebration; a national coming-together perhaps without parallel at least since the last time this country went to war.

While on the subject, I can't help but wonder what it is about our national mental make-up that makes us so ready to come together in the face of threat, but so incredibly fractious in times of relative peace -- but that, perhaps, is grist for another mill, at another time.

For now, my thoughts centre around the recent thermonuclear adventure. And one question that keeps hammering away in my head is -- was it all really, truly, necessary?

For the record, I am an Indian, and proud of the fact. And as an Indian, a proud one at that, I believe this country needs, deserves, the means to defend itself, to maintain and safeguard its sovereignty. Too many people have sacrificed too much to gain that freedom for us, now, to lightly toss it away.

Having assimilated all that, the niggling question remains -- does "defence" equate with "hydrogen bomb"?

Look at the sequence of events. India test-fires Prithvi. Pakistan test-fires Ghauri. India tests its nuclear -- and thermonuclear -- options. Pakistan is readying to do the same (In fact -- and I am indebted to no less than Brajesh Mishra, principal secretary to the prime minister, for this information -- Pakistan already has the bomb.) So what precisely have we gained, via this Mexican standoff?

Then there is the China angle -- and first up, no one is denying that China does pose some sort of threat to India. The question that needs asking -- and answering -- is, can one nuclear bomb be a defence against a country with a few dozen, plus the capacity to make even more?

"Deterrence" is a word I hear often used in this context, as if it explains the entire situation. So what does this deterrence comprise? What precisely are we telling China? 'You probably can convert India into one giant-sized radioactive crater, but we'll take a few of you out with us when we go?'

I don't know about you -- but I am not sure that my thermonuclearised soul will derive much comfort from the knowledge that a few thousand Chinese souls have been similarly vapourised.

Think of this for a moment: is any single one of us under the illusion that anyone can actually win a nuclear war? No? What then is the use of a nuclear arsenal?

Around this point, a good few of you guys out there are probably itching to just hit "page down", find the mail link and let fly some choice abuses. "Liberal" -- the label that is immediately stuck on anyone prepared to think for himself -- will probably be the mildest of them. But hey, hang on -- a guy can think aloud, can't he? That is what I am doing here -- no more, no less.

And while I think, I also remember.

November 28 to December 1, 1996: Chinese President Jiang Zemin sets foot on Indian soil. The first ever state visit to India by a Chinese head of state.

This was seen as the logical culmination of a thaw in Sino-Indian relations that began in 1988 with the then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's state visit to Beijing, and was further fostered in 1993 by then prime minister P V Narasimha Rao during his own visit to that country.

The highlight of Jiang Zemin's visit was the signing of an agreement on Confidence Building Measures between the two countries (given how notoriously short public memory is, a comprehensive review of the various agreements signed during that visit is attached herewith).

To hit the high spots, the measures agreed upon include a clause that neither side shall use, or threaten to use, force against the other; that a drastic reduction of forces will be carried out by both countries within mutually-agreed geographical zones along the common border; that neither country will fly combat aircraft within 10 km of the Line of Control...

While these and other measures are designed to reduce tension along the border, there are others aimed at strengthening economic ties. More importantly, the joint outcome of the talks is an increasing tendency for China and India to take the lead in creating a strong Sino-South Asian confederacy.

The motive underlying China's attempt to rope India into a strong alliance was easy enough to understand. Increasingly, China has been isolated by the United States -- the defence tie-up earlier in 1996 between the US, Australia and Indonesia being merely one more instance in point. China's diplomatic drive, obviously, was to counter the US by bringing the South Asian nations into its umbrella, in a strong counter-alliance.

To this end, China had not -- till the recent tests -- demanded India's adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, nor pressed for a South Asian nuclear-free zone. Further, China was among the first to vote for a permanent place for India on the UN Security Council, during the elections in 1996, when the United States had set its face against the move.

But the strongest indicator that China was drastically re-thinking its strategy in South Asia came on December 1, when Zemin flew from New Delhi to Islamabad.

Bear in mind that till that point in time, China had openly sided the Pakistan stance on Kashmir, and insisted that the issue should be settled as per the provisions of the Shimla Accord, in the light of UN resolutions to that effect.

However, on December 1, 1996, Jiang Zemin shocked his hosts in Islamabad by lecturing them on the "art of the possible", studiously refrained from uttering one single word about the Kashmir issue, and exhorted Pakistan to "temporarily shelve intractable issues" in order to normalise relations with its neighbour.

Shorn of diplomatic verbiage, Jiang Zemin flat out told Islamabad to stop rabble-rousing on Kashmir.

Further, in a speech to the Pakistani senate on December 2, the Chinese president outlined his plans for a Sino-South Asian block and said that his proposals were "oriented towards the 21st century" and "intended to bring about "lasting geopolitical stability in the region".

Again, the compulsions behind China's changed stance on Indo-Pakistan relations was easy to understand. For during the same period, the Clinton administration, which hailed Pakistan as its "strategic ally", had begun getting increasingly involved in helping Pakistan keep the Kashmir issue in focus.

To this end, the US had earlier that year warned India of "complacency", and called on it to bring about "internal reforms" within the Valley, besides opening a dialogue with Pakistan on the issue. China, obviously, was seeking to counter the increasing propensity of the US to meddle in the region.

It would appear, judging by the above, that relations between the two countries were on the mend, right? Right -- now check the timing.

Rao's visit to Beijing -- widely hailed at the time, both in India and abroad, as an immense step towards total normalisation of relations, was in 1993.

Jiang Zemin's visit was in November 1996.

But in between, in May 1996, the BJP, under Vajpayee, had briefly -- for all of 13 days -- ruled the country. And as per the BJP's own recent admission, during that period it had intended to carry out the thermonuclear test.

I don't know how it strikes you -- but to my mind, against this background, the Central government's claim, today, that the N-tests were necessitated by the perception of an increased threat from China sounds hollow.

If indeed that is the case, if the tests of May 11 and May 13 were prompted by a heightened threat perception today, what then was the provocation for the attempted test in May 1996? What was the tearing hurry, on the part of a government that did not even have the necessary numbers to survive a vote of confidence in Parliament? Surely, in context of the diplomatic undercurrents of that time, as outlined above, the threat perception could not have been as great?

A question begs the asking here: if, in May 1996, the Chinese threat was so great as to impel the Vajpayee government to consider nuclear testing, how come India survived from then to now, without peril and without aforesaid testing?

It is this which makes me think, wonder, speculate on the actual motives that impelled the Vajpayee government to go in for this adventure right now.

I hear, in the aftermath of the tests, much talk of "strength", of India now asserting itself, and all the rest of it. And I am all for that -- as I have had occasion to say elsewhere, in a cricketing context, I do not think India has to tolerate the snide remarks, the sneers and jibes and blatant bias, of the rest of the world, I do think it is time to give back as good as we get, if not better.

But a nuclear bomb, to my mind, does not achieve that objective. I mean, let's pour some cold water on our heads, get rid of the thermonuclear heat generated in the aftermath of the Pokharan tests, and logically think one question through: we have a bomb today, but do we dare use it?

No.

We cannot use it against a non-nuclear country, because to do so will truly -- and deservedly -- make us an international pariah. Neither can we use it against a nuclear country -- simply because all five of them have far, far greater strength in that department than we do, both in terms of nuclear warheads, and the ability to deliver them to devastating impact.

Ergo, today we have a bomb we cannot use.

So why did we bother to acquire it?

What else could we have done, could be the counter question. Well, for a start, given that there were diplomatic overtures between India and China through this period, we could have shifted into overdrive, attempted to completely enlist China as an ally. And thus countered the threat of Pakistan, which has in that same period of time moved unabashedly into the arms of Uncle Sam.

If that thought occurs to me, it could even more readily have occurred to Vajpayee -- erstwhile holder of the external affairs portfolio, and a man who, even when out of government, has been looked upon as one of our best performers in the arena of international diplomacy.

That diplomatic option is, today, ruled out in its entirety. And China, which during this decade has been making increasingly friendly noises, has done a complete turnaround, and is today one of the bitterest, most vociferous of critics.

I look around me, and I see an orgy of "celebration". Of "victory rallies" being organised by the BJP, by the RSS. And I wonder -- in the first place, is it a "victory", a cause for "celebration", that India has today acquired the ability to kill hundreds of thousands of people? Would not a more muted public profile have been more appropriate?

Would it not have been more statesmanlike, more true to the Indian character, to say something like, 'We have today been forced to acquire the ultimate weapon. It is a terrible burden, the knowledge of what we possess today. India prays for strength to bear that burden with grace and with responsibility, to use its strength for good'... or words to this effect?

Does this open gloating, this blatant jingoism, not leave a bad taste in the mouth?

Another strange aspect of the situation strikes me, the more I think about it.

I mean, where the hell is 'Honest George' Fernandes?

We are talking, here, not of internal security but external threat -- essentially, a subject for the defence minister. And yet, from May 11 to date, there has not been one single statement from the country's defence minister, either pro, or con.

George Fernandes, India's defence minister, was not considered by his own prime minister to be important enough to be informed of the impending N-test.

Who is actually making statements, at the rate of several dozen a day? Brajesh Mishra and Pramod Mahajan -- both extra-constitutional authorities. One has not sought election to office, the other lost miserably. Neither form part of the government. Yet they present the government view.

Meanwhile, George Fernandes, the minister directly concerned with the question, imitates Gandhi's 'three monkeys'. Not one word from him, in seven days since the blast.

Which in turn raises another question. When in the run up to the election the BJP presented its manifesto, several contentious issues figured therein. There was Ayodhya. Also Kashi and Mathura. There was Article 370. There was the intention of inducting the nuclear bomb.

When the BJP failed to get even close to a working majority on its own steam, it was forced to shelve its manifesto, to come up with what it called the National Agenda -- which remained silent on the contentious items contained in the BJP manifesto.

The ubiquitous Pramod Mahajan was the one who explained the volte face, thus: When we are forced to depend on other parties for a mandate, we cannot do what we want, we have to go for a government by consensus.

So what does the National Agenda -- the document of governance agreed on by the alliance government, say about the nuclear bomb? That it will "review the existing defence situation, and induct nuclear weapons if found necessary".

Did that promised review of the defence situation take place?

No. It was called, but the testing pre-empted it.

In this connection, here is what Fernandes -- the country's defence minister, I reiterate, since this fact seems to have entirely slipped our collective minds -- said about the nuclear option, while answering questions about the national agenda: "Nuclear weaponry is not a priority area for me. Nevertheless, we will keep the option open."

For a non-priority area, the government -- minus the minister most directly concerned -- appears to have moved with incredible haste.

What has Vajpayee done here, when reduced to stark black and white? Ignored the much-touted "governance by consensus", and put in place "governance by fait accompli". Simply put, he went ahead and bust the bomb -- painting his allies into his corner and forcing them to support the move, rather than taking them into his confidence before the event, and seeking a consensus.

Mahajan, again, has the answer: "If too many people know something, you cannot keep it a secret."

Sorry, but I find that incredibly condescending. What he is saying in effect is that he, who was neither elected to government nor holds a recognised government office, is capable of keeping the deepest secrets -- but the elected representatives of the people, the party leaders who supported Vajpayee and installed him as prime minister, are incapable of similar discretion.

My patriotism is better than yours, in other words.

With this perspective in mind, I sit with the newspaper files relating to the two months of this government's existence, and what do I see? Completely, totally negative press. Not, mind you, of the kind that comes from the Opposition. But relating to the loss through attrition of Sedapatti Muthiah and Buta Singh from the Federal Cabinet. And the contretemps involving Sukh Ram. As Jaipal Reddy said at the time, the situation was: "Two down, without a run on the board!"

And almost every single day, banner headlines that read "Jayalalitha attacks..." "Jayalalitha blasts..." "Jayalalitha demands..."

I review those headlines, those news stories. And I get the picture of a government in paralysis, a prime minister in fetters, a party in ICU desperately struggling for oxygen.

This is the situation till as late as May 10.

On that day, the lead headline reads: "Allies step up pressure on BJP" -- and details the story of the first meeting of the Coordination Committee, wherein Jayalalitha opposed her own government's power ordinance and demanded anew that the TN government be sacked; Parkash Singh Badal expressed reservations about the power ordinance; Nitish Kumar complained of law and order breakdown in Bihar and demands Central intervention; Mamata Bannerjee complained of the CPM government in Bengal; Naveen Patnaik of the law and order situation in Orissa...

The overall impression on that day, as indeed on every day since March 12 when the news broke that Jayalalitha had withheld her letter of support, was of a helpless BJP, beset by fractious allies.

A day later, the picture changes dramatically. From that day to this, the thermonuclear tests dominate the headlines and almost the entire available space in all newspapers.

Suddenly, whatever Jayalalitha demands, asserts, even alleges, has been buried in the inside pages, next to advertisements for pet poodles.

By undertaking the tests, the Indian government let itself in for attack by the entire international community -- and that global fallout was predictable, wasn't it?

So, the expected reaction comes. And this, in turn, has the effect of consolidating the entire country -- including the Opposition -- behind the government. I mean, anyone who dares voice a contrary view ipso facto becomes a "traitor" today, doesn't he? (A label, incidentally, that I suspect I am going to be stuck with, at least from some sections, for writing this.)

You know what all this reminds me of? Mid-year 1975 -- when the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, whose descent into political oblivion became increasingly imminent, screamed hoarse about the foreign threat, then used it to impose Emergency on this country.

Today, it is a -- let's not mince words here -- minority government, under attack from its own allies. And what do we get? The Chinese threat. The thermonuclear response. And shrill assertations of national pride, of the nation's readiness to meet every threat.

All calculated to bring the country together. All calculated to silence all opposition, of all kinds, from all sources.

Okay, just for the moment, let us accept the threat perception. Let us accept that this in turn gives a logical reason for the nuclear testing. Let us accept the government's rationale in toto.

Accepting that, let us look at an item that I saw on page three of The Indian Express, dated May 16, 1998. It says that sand from the Pokharan test site will be collected and taken around the state, in what is already being dubbed a "nuclear yatra".

I read the item, but I still don't believe it! When the party is reduced to two seats in Parliament, when oblivion stares it in the face, it is Ramjanambhoomi and the rath yatra.

Today, when after considerable heartburn the BJP finally gets to install its government, then finds itself on the receiving end of Jayalalitha's hysterics from day one, it is a nuclear yatra??!!

Are we going just that little smidgin over the top on this thing, here?

I think of all this -- and one question springs to mind. It is a question I ask as a responsible Indian. One committed to its defence, to its security and, even more, to its standing and stature in the international community. Just as committed as any other Indian is -- yeah, right, including our prime minister.

As a committed Indian citizen, I am prepared to face international opprobrium, sanctions, the works, if what is at stake is the defence, the security, the integrity of my country.

But is that what is really at stake, here?

That is my real question: Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, did it finally take a thermonuclear explosion to blast Jayalalitha Jayaram out of the front pages of the newspapers, and out of your hair?

The Rediff Special

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